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Introduction 
This paper addresses the issues of gender, ethnicity, identity, and exile caused 
by conflict constructed as ethnic strife. The discussion reflects upon some aspects and 
findings of my empirical research among refugees from former Yugoslavia who were 
in exile in Serbia, Italy and the Netherlands.1 The examination of the situation of 
refugees, who were of different ethnic backgrounds,2 in these three different 
settlement contexts examines the processes of (re)shaping ethnic identity in exile and 
- against this background - deals with questions concerning conflict resolution and 
post-conflict reconstruction in the country of origin which is also influenced by the 
experiences and identity processes of returnees. The paper specifically focuses on 
different state interventions in the three settlement contexts and their role in 
(re)shaping ethnic boundaries among the refugees from former Yugoslavia. It 
proposes that settlement policies and practices play an important role in boundary 
formation and (re)creation of inter-ethnic ties in exile. These processes, in turn, affect 
prospects of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in the country of 
origin. 
 
The importance of examining the process of boundary formation in places of 
exile and its link to post-conflict reconstruction in the places of origin is embedded in 
the acknowledgement that the primary targets of the very logic and political economy 
of  ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999) are social networks, social systems and the social fabric 
of life in community. Orchestrated insecurity and violence deployed by warring 
parties in this type of conflict, are aimed at destroying the very relations that form the 
foundations of conventional society (Duffied, 1997). Duffied points out that 
destruction in this type of conflict does not only have a physical and material 
 2
dimension, but also social, civil and political one. Consequently, the questions of 
reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction are critically and centrally linked to 
issues of rebuilding communities and social networks destroyed by war.3  
 
The identity processes shaped by different contexts of settlement are central to 
addressing the social and political consequences of mass displacement of people 
fleeing conflict constructed as ethnic strife. The processes of (re)shaping ethnic 
boundaries facilitate refugee settlement and influence the prospects of post-conflict 
reconstruction in the places of origin, because rebuilding of war-torn societies is also 
influenced by the experiences and identity processes of returnees. In this paper I will 
analyse and discuss the problems of people fleeing conflict constructed as ethnic strife 
and emphasise the importance of processes of boundary formation. A number of 
analyses have focussed on the construction of ethnic boundaries among refugee 
populations fleeing former Yugoslavia and in doing so have discussed the pre-conflict 
socio-economic and cultural conditions as well as the consequences of violent 
conflict.  However, too little attention has been paid to the flexibility of ethnic 
boundaries among the peoples from former Yugoslavia and the contextual shifts in the 
line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that take place in exile. I argue in this paper that state 
interventions, such as policies targeting refugee populations fleeing conflicts that are 
constructed as ethnic, play an important role in (re)shaping ethnic boundaries. This 
argument is based on the recognition that ethnic boundaries are 
not fixed or primordial and more importantly, that it is not always the most 
appropriate principle around which social activity or identity may be 
organised. In some situations it has so little relevance that participants may 
simply set it aside, acting without reference to their ‘ethnic’ affiliations 
(Wallman 1979.: x) 
 
On this basis I will explore shifts in the construction of ethnic boundaries among 
refugees of variety of ethnic backgrounds from former Yugoslavia in different 
countries of exile. I will examine the structural factors that influence and organise 
their experience and shape ethnic identity and I will demonstrate that some policies 
and practices are creating conditions in which ethnic boundaries have little meaning in 
the social activities and identity formation of refugees from the post Yugoslav states. 
Thus, certain circumstances of exile may enhance the creation of inter-ethnic social 
networks as a means of bettering the process of their settlement and integration. 
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Many studies have emphasised the value of social networks for the integration 
of refugees in receiving societies (I discussed this elsewhere, too, Korac, 2003). It is 
also important to emphasise the value of these networks in post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts in the regions affected by ‘new wars’. In an earlier study I 
showed that the development of wide social networks, both within and outside the 
ethnic group, is central to how refugees assess their situation and integration in the 
places they settled (Korac, 2003). Social interaction within, across and outside their 
ethnic group, as I pointed out, contributes to their subjective well-being by making 
them feel part of the social fabric in the new environment (Korac, 2003). Furthermore 
I will argue here that social interaction across ethnic boundaries in exile is also 
important for the process of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in 
sending areas as it affects refugee attitudes towards cross-ethnic coexistence and 
hence towards return.  
 
The discussion in this paper is based upon my research carried over the past 
ten years in which I examined different stages of the migration cycle of forcibly 
displaced people from the region of the post Yugoslav states. One of the aims of this 
empirical research was to explore the issues of settlement of refugees in receiving 
societies, both in or close to zones of conflict as well as in the developed world, 
specifically the EU. In the three contexts of exile I discuss in this paper, one within 
the region of former Yugoslavia (Serbia), and the two further away, in Europe (Italy 
and the Netherlands). As mentioned above, one of the central issues has been 
boundary formation. The boundary process, as Wallman (1979) explains, is 
happening: 
in response to several different kinds of variable, and on a number of different 
levels. The factors affecting it may be macro and micro, a function of structure 
or perception, of changes in history or of situation” (1979: 5). 
 
Wallman further suggests that a social boundary is embedded in both the 
‘organisation of society’ and the ‘organisation of experience’ thus “neither element 
has more or less reality than the other. Both the difference and the sense of difference 
count” (Wallman, 1979: 7). One of the important macro factors affecting the process 
of boundary formation relates to the organisation of society including state policies 
and interventions regulating the social ‘system’. Depending on the specific historic, 
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social and political context, these interventions may aim to construct boundaries of 
difference, as was the case in Serbia at the time of my research, in 1994, 1995, 1996 
and 1997.4 Further, they may intend to reshape them in order to facilitate a more 
inclusionary society, as was the case in the Netherlands at the time of my fieldwork in 
2000 and 2001. Alternatively, there may be the absence of any articulated policies 
specifically concerned with refugee community development, and more generally of 
policies aiming at social inclusion and integration, as was the case in Italy at the time 
of my research in 1999 and 2000.5 In the three contexts, micro factors, that is the 
perception of difference among refugees from former Yugoslavia, are important 
elements affecting the process of boundary formation in each of these settlement 
contexts.  As will be shown, the intersection of macro and micro factors 
characterising different settlement contexts shapes the process of boundary formation 
in the specific places of exile. 
 
Refugees in Serbia, state interventions and boundary formation 
 
My examination of gender aspects of forced migration of refugees in the 
Balkans demonstrates the centrality of gender in the formation of new ethnicised 
states. Statistical data show that over 70 per cent of refugees in some regions were 
women and children (USCR, 1993). I propose that this massive gendered population 
transfer has operated as a critical symbolic and practical element in reshaping 
boundaries between ethnic collectives (Korac, 1999). Uprooted women, I suggest, 
became symbolically and strategically important in the destruction of opposed ethnic 
collectives. The role women play in this process is centrally related to their role in the 
ideological and biological reproduction of their collectives. As several studies have 
pointed out (Yuval-Davis and Anthias,1989; Walby, 1992; Brah, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 
1993), women are conceived as cultural embodiments of collectives and their 
boundaries, as well as participants in ethnic-national struggles. Therefore, I argue, that 
a forced migration of women in wars constructed as ethnic is both practically and 
symbolically the most effective way of (re)shaping the boundaries of an ethnic 
collective. Forcing women to flee their homes is, however, just one of the critical 
elements in this process. The process of (re)shaping boundaries, as my research 
documents, continues in the place of women’s exile and, I argue, is central to further 
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consolidating nationalistic projects of ethnic division and consequently, to the 
formation of new states based upon essentialist notions of belonging. 
 
My research on the situation of refugee women of variety of ethnic 
backgrounds who fled to Serbia from Croatia and Bosnia documented that various 
state interventions were crucial for furthering divisions among exiled women along 
and within ethnic lines. Through various policies, the public media, and education, 
these state imposed divisions become a powerful tool of controlling refugee women in 
order to prevent the formation of alliances among women of different ethnic 
backgrounds. These alliances, I proposed, were based upon the realisation of exiled 
women that refugees of other ethnic backgrounds were also victimised. The alliances 
were also based on their shared experience of difficulties in exile, regardless of their 
ethnicity (Korac, 1998). As a refugee woman of Serbian ethnic background from 
Bosnia explained: 
 
There are refugees [in collective accommodation] from various regions. There 
are Serb, Croat and Muslim women. We're linked by a common fate. I share a 
much better understanding with Croat and Muslim refugees than with the people 
here [in Serbia]. I live here, if this can be called a life. They [the local 
population] don't understand me, I don't understand them. There are frequent 
disputes and I think that I prefer to talk to refugees of any nationality, that we 
understand each other better. 
 
This and other testimonies of refugee women in my research document how ethnicity is 
not always relevant to social relationships in which people of different culture interact. 
These testimonies support Wallman’s argument that when ethnicity is used “in a context 
for which any of the participants deems it inappropriate, it becomes for them a crippling 
liability” (1979: x). This is not to argue that all refugees I interviewed have articulated 
their experience of exile and belonging in the same way. Rather, their accounts show that 
notions of belonging cannot be fitted into a single mould, because “identity is 
constructed across difference (Hall, 1987: 44). 
 
Experiences of exile expose the hollowness of essentialist beliefs in the 
‘common destiny’ of ethnic collectives and related narratives. These experiences were 
crucial in creating counter-narratives of women’s belonging. Although these counter-
narratives of belonging and related alliances were not widespread at the time of my 
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research, I argue that they represent a potential for the (re)creation of multi-ethnic 
social networks in communities destroyed by war. 
 
These emerging inter-ethnic alliances and trans-group coalitions were not 
entirely spontaneous either. Rather, they emerged primarily among exiled women 
who were involved in multi-ethnic self-help groups initiated and facilitated by some 
women’s groups in Serbia (Korac, 1998). This kind of practice and ‘identity work’ of 
women’s groups existed in all the post-Yugoslav states and was part of the emerging 
resistance of some women to nationalism and war. An activist of the Women in Black, 
Belgrade, explained some aspects of their work with refugee women: 
They [refugee women] have every right to their bitterness towards people from 
other ethnic origin, and we [women activists and workshop facilitators] let them 
say things. However, in some of our workshops, I would talk about my friends 
who were of other ethnic origin, we'd [women activists] read a letter from 
Sarajevo which we got from a Muslim woman. In time, they got used to being 
able to talk about neighbours and friends of other ethnicity. Because they came 
here thinking they could never talk about them, that they have to say that they 
[neighbours/friends of different ethnicity] are all ‘genocidal’, that they should all 
be killed, in order to make some friends here. Then, in time [during workshop 
discussions], out of the blue friends emerged [in there stories and memories], 
daughters in law, neighbours of various ethnic backgrounds, they all emerged [in 
their stories and memories] out of the blue [during workshop discussions], who 
didn't exist [in their stories, thoughts and memories] up to then.  
 
This and other forms of cross-ethnic identity work and assistance helped refugee 
women not only to regain their self-respect and to re-establish their lives gradually, 
but it also became an avenue to rebuilding a sense of mutual trust and consequently, 
the social fabric of life destroyed by war. This form of activism also became a two-
way learning process between refugees and activists. The following account of an 
activist of Women in Black details the character of this learning process: 
The most important value of our work during these wars [the work of 
Women in Black and some other women’s groups] has been the work 
with women who developed some kind of new autonomy and agency, 
and I refer here to women refugees in particular. They overcame the 
role of a victim. They developed this new sense of autonomy and 
agency through the process of confrontation with pain. It sounds 
paradoxical, but their struggle to protect their experiences of pain and 
suffering from manipulation and misuse [by local nationalists], led to 
empowerment, to agency…I call it a positive approach to crisis. We've 
[women refugees and activists] learned to take a crisis as a challenge, 
and not as a catastrophe. We've learned to take control over our 
traumatic experiences by thinking positively.  
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This process of learning also created a situation in which the individual resistance of 
women to manipulation by nationalists and their ideologies created a potential of 
becoming more politically articulated and powerful. It opened a new space for 
understanding differences among women and peoples in the war-torn region. As this 
mutual process of learning through cross ethnic communication was based on the 
principles of ‘rooting and shifting’. Yuval-Davis (1997: 130) explains this type of 
communication as the one that does not involve self-decentering or losing one’s own 
set of values, nor homogenization of the ‘other’. As such, the communication based 
on principles of rooting and shifting they established with refugee women from 
variety of ethnic backgrounds could have played an important role in the process of 
peaceful conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. The activist of Women in 
Black explains how this potential has been created: 
The experience of work with women refugees has helped me when I 
was for the first time [after the break of the war] in Bosnia, in 1995. It 
helped me to perceive the differences among women through a new 
lense. The experience of work with women refugees has helped me to 
perceive calmly and tolerantly our differences and to understand how 
these differentiated positionings of women provoke different kinds of 
vulnerability. The reactions of women in Bosnia might've been 
different from mine, but my experience has helped me to perceive our 
differences in a new way. That doesn't mean that I think that there 
aren't differences that would be hard to overcome, but there are those 
which we definitively can surmount. 
 
However, in a political context where essentialist notions of ethnic 
identification are informing the nation and are central to the claim for power, any 
form of trans-group coalition is seen as a challenge to the power structure. Therefore, 
the state-imposed ethnic division among exiled women became strategically 
important in Serbia. In conjunction with women’s own diverse experience of war and 
victimisation, this state-imposed ethnic division tends to reduce all other but ethnic 
differences among exiled women, such as age, class or urban/rural divide. It also 
overshadows similarities of their experiences in exile, the ones that are not necessarily 
linked to their ethnicity. Therefore, the organisation of the receiving society facilitated 
by divisive state interventions was to some extent congruent with the organisation of 
experience of ethnic boundaries created by war and victimisation. The former tended 
to strengthen the subjective sense of difference among refugee women. The level of 
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compatibility between the two factors affecting boundary formation played an 
important role in undermining the reconciliatory potential of the ‘identity work’ 
initiated by some women’s groups. 
 
Consequently, for women refugees of non-Serbian ethnic backgrounds, the 
place of exile carried the characteristics of a war zone, as they found themselves in the 
environment where they represented a demonised ethnic group. As a consequence, 
many of them tried to resettle in a third country in search of safety and “a minimal 
condition for some kind of democracy of selves” (Cockburn, 1997). Therefore, the 
state policies were in effect furthering ethnic cleansing and had far reaching 
consequences for peaceful conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
For women refugees of Serbian ethnic background, the place of exile also 
carried threats to their rights and safety. They were often forced to ‘return’, that is to 
forcibly move to the territories controlled by Serbian forces in Bosnia or Croatia in 
the name of ‘national security’. The following words of a Serbian woman, a refugee 
from Bosnia,  demonstrate a kind of problems these women faced: 
 They called me; it was April 19, 1994, to report to the Red Cross. I got 
there; one young person and an old woman were there. 'Where are your 
papers, your refugee I.D. ‘Where do you come from?’, she asks. I said 
Sarajevo. ‘Would you live in Srbinje?’6 I didn't need to hear any more. I 
said: Where's that? ‘Formerly Foca’, she said. And then she went on to 
tell me what state that's in, that it's the Bosnian Serb Republic. Where's 
that, I asked, in Africa? And on whose blood-covered doorstep were you 
thinking of settling me? ‘Well, the mujahedin killed the Serbs’, she says. 
Wait a minute, I said, you can't talk to me like that. How dare you, a 
clerk, settle me in a state I don't belong to. Then I went mad and 
quarrelled with her. And they took away my refugee ID.  
 
Forced return of women to these territories (even if they were not at home there) was 
important both strategically and symbolically. It was not only that refugee women 
were to repopulate the deserted territories heavily affected by war. They were also 
considered as ‘naturally’ suited to rebuilding ethnic communities. As Peterson and 
Runyan (1993) argue, women are considered as “life givers” and thus are “expected to 
restore ‘life’ after a death-dealing war is over[...] Thus, after the devastation they must 
‘pick up the pieces’ and create the conditions for repopulating society” (1993: 82). 
Women are also perceived as pillars of society, as they are traditionally seen as 
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caretakers and guardians of their children, men and homes. They represent these roles 
even more starkly in time of war and consequently, are the best ‘weapon’ in the 
struggle for a ‘sacred national cause’ of ethnically cleansed and expanded territories.  
 
Refugee women who were resourceful enough to fight for their rights, as well 
as those in ethnically mixed marriages whose alliances with their ethnic collective 
were regarded problematic, were labelled as ‘traitors’ to their nation.  The following 
account of a refugee woman from Bosnia, who is of Serbian ethnic background and 
married to a Muslim from Bosnia, reveals difficulties these women faced: 
Some neighbours and friends here in Serbia blame me, they say ‘go to Alija’ 
[Izetbegovic, the then president of Bosnia-Herzegovina] ‘take your Muslim 
children away,’ ‘You should all be slaughtered, killed’ and more. It even went so 
far that my parents said ‘let your husband die,’ or ‘we wish him dead.’ That hurt 
me a lot. 
 
At the moment when political power in Serbia radically shifted along unified ethnic 
lines, this state-imposed ‘othering’ of refugee women rapidly became part of the 
social and cultural fabric of life resulting in their stigmatisation. The stigmatisation of 
refugee women who were in ethnically mixed marriages often resulted in their 
attempts to resettle to a third country. These processes strengthened the ethnic 
homogeneity of the newly created nation states in the region, which had far-reaching 
consequences for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
 Mixed marriages were at the core of a rich unified culture of the region before 
the conflict (Kaldor 1999:34), and were not only a strong sign of peaceful multi-
ethnic co-existence but also of community cohesion. Mixed marriages were one of the 
most significant demographic and cultural characteristics of Yugoslav society. 
Although ethnically mixed marriages were more typically found in urban areas, they 
were also common in rural areas. Approximately two million people in the region 
were either spouses or children of ethnically mixed marriages (Petrovic 1985). At the 
time of the 1981 census,7 people of ethnically mixed background outnumbered 
Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, and Slovenes, and were themselves 
outnumbered only by Croats and Serbs (Petrovic 1985). Mixed marriages were a 
prerequisite for multi-ethnic co-existance and tolerance in the region. For this reason, 
people who have been married inter-ethnically have been under attack by militant 
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nationalists for whom these marriages were a major obstacle to their fundamentalist 
goals. Furthermore, those in ethnically mixed marriages can play invaluable role in 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, as they have a genuine interest in 
rebuilding inter-ethnic ties in their places of origin. Their declining presence has 
reduced the prospects of reconstructing these post-conflict societies into communities 
of ethnic tolerance. 
 
This brief overview of my research about women refugees in Serbia intended 
to point to the intersection of gender and nationalism leading to the processes of 
‘othering’ of exiled women. The state imposed ethnic divisions, I propose, 
represented a conscious effort to reduce any possibility of recreating inter-ethnic ties 
destroyed by war. The state interventions aimed at shaping boundary formation  
among exiled women were in effect furthering the logic of war. In other words, they 
can be regarded as ‘peaceful’ instruments of war that has uprooted every fourth or 
fifth citizen of the region. By August 1995, four to five million people have become 
internally displaced persons or refugees either within the post-Yugoslav states or in 
Europe, North America and Australia.8 This brings me to a brief overview of some 
aspects and findings of my research about refugee from former Yugoslavia settled in 
Italy and the Netherlands. 
 
Refugees from former Yugoslavia in Italy and the Netherlands: integration policies 
and boundary formation 
 
My examination of refugees from former Yugoslavia in Italy and the 
Netherlands focused on their strategies for integration under specific policy contexts. 
In examining the experiences of refugees in exile, I explored, among other issues, the 
character of their social networks and the role these networks play in the process of 
settlement and/or return. 
 
Studies on diaspora communities demonstrate that although they may assist 
and support their members (Hugo, 1981; Massey et al. 1987; Cases, 1987), they may 
also be characterised by division, exploitation, and in some cases political violence 
(Van Hear, 1998). My research among refugees in Rome and Amsterdam indicates 
 11
that policies of receiving societies in specific circumstances play a role in 
transplanting ethnic tension among refugees fleeing ‘new wars’ or in alleviating them.  
 
In the Italian context, where refugees are particularly disadvantaged because 
of the lack of social security systems, assistance provided by migrant networks 
literally means survival. However, in Italy and in Rome specifically, networks of ‘old’ 
immigrants from former Yugoslavia were underdeveloped, because Italy has not been 
an attractive destination for earlier voluntary migrants (i.e. ‘guest workers’) from 
former Yugoslavia. Hence, social networks that were almost exclusively refugee 
networks assisted those who fled the war-torn region and came to Rome. These 
refugee networks served as an alternative ‘self-reception’ system for disseminating 
information, resolving housing problems, and finding work.9 Only in exceptional 
cases, were some of the refugees I interviewed helped through contacts with old 
migrant networks in Rome. A man of ethnically mixed background from Bosnia 
explains why this was the case:  
Our comunità is small [of refugees from variety of ethnic backgrounds and 
parts of former Yugoslavia], most got here in 91-92 and 93, at the beginning 
of the war. Those that were here before [old immigrants] just couldn't fit in 
with those who came during this war. Their attitude [of old immigrants] 
towards Italy was different as well as the attitude towards the people who were 
fleeing the war [in former Yugoslavia]. We weren't people looking for jobs 
and a better life. The situations we were faced with here were extreme - no 
regular papers in the beginning, no job, war in our country - so those strong 
ties were made among those who fled the war [irrespective of their ethnicity]. 
 
Almost all of the interviewees were also sceptical about these old migrant networks 
and community organisations because their activities were perceived as political, in a 
sense that they were preoccupied with the developments of war and nationalistic 
agendas of the new states that emerged in the region of former Yugoslavia. Thus, 
most of the refugees in my research described the presence and visibility of these old 
migrant networks in Italy and Rome as primarily linked to their campaigns for 
winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Italian public for ‘their cause’. Consequently, 
the activism of old migrant networks was perceived as politically motivated, rather 
than emerging from their humanitarian concerns about the situation of refugees in 
Italy.  
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 My research among refugees in Rome reveals that the refugee networks were 
composed of people of all ethnic origins and from different parts of former 
Yugoslavia and that the vast majority of refugees had contacts across ethnic 
boundaries. This is not to argue though that these refugee communities were free from 
ethnic tensions resulting from the conflict in the region. Rather, it is to indicate that 
the policy context of the receiving country influenced how refugees coped with and 
organised their experience of ethnic persecution caused by the conflict they fled. A 
woman of ethnically mixed background from Bosnia said about the character of these 
tensions: 
Each of us had our own opinions about politics. We'd have disputes over that, 
but despite the political discussions, we'd help each other whenever we could, 
regardless of where we were from and what our political views were.  
 
The intensive contacts across ethnic boundaries revealed in this research resulted from 
the specific circumstances in which they took place. They happened primarily because 
of the absence of an organised reception and assistance system. Consequently, for 
many of the refugees, contacts across ethnic boundaries were literally a matter of 
physical survival during their first years in Rome. A Muslim man from Bosnia 
explains how and why these contacts and networks developed:  
During the first years [in Rome] the refugees from ex-Yugoslavia [from 
variety of ethnic backgrounds] were the circle I used to socialise with. We 
were pretty united in these years, we stuck together, those who would and 
could help each other.  
 
The refugees from former Yugoslavia found themselves in the context in which ethnic 
boundaries had little relevance for their situation in exile and were not the most 
appropriate principle around which to organise their activities and lives. It can be 
argued, therefore, that the characteristics of the policy context concerning refugees in 
Italy have created a situation in which people fleeing the deeply divided and war-torn 
region had to recreate links and coexistence destroyed by war. These cross-ethnic 
links helped them to confront poverty, disempowerment and marginalisation they 
experienced during their first years in Rome. 
 
 This cross-ethnic networking was facilitated by three contributing factors. 
First, social ties within ethnic communities of nationals from the post Yugoslav states 
in Rome can be characterised as weak, because they are not based on family or 
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kinship relationships. The absence of family and kinship ties among the studied 
population is primarily the result of the policy context that did not allow family 
reunification and was generally unfavourable to people fleeing with families. The 
former was due to the humanitarian/temporary status of the majority of refugees from 
former Yugoslavia in Italy and Rome which does not permit refugees to bring in their 
families. The latter was the consequence of the lack of any kind of support and 
services for refugees in general and for those with children in particular. Without 
provision of housing and eligibility for social benefits it is profoundly difficult to 
survive, particularly for those with families. Second, the lack of established 
community organisations supported by the Italian authorities or by the governments 
of the post-Yugoslav states created a need for spontaneous self-organising by the 
newly arrived refugees. These networks enabled them to cope better with their day-to-
day problems in fulfilling their immediate needs, which proved to be common to all 
regardless of their ethnic background. This spontaneity largely freed this population 
from political disputes about the conflict, the causes of their flight, and other highly 
politically charged issues. These circumstances meant that, to paraphrase Wallman 
(1979), the identity politics of war could have not been transplanted into the new 
context by boxing them into their respective ethnic groups. Rather, they had to reach 
outside their ethnic groups and form cross-ethnic networks in order to confront 
marginalization and discrimination in Italy. Third, the characteristics of the refugee 
population from former Yugoslavia in Rome have also contributed to the 
establishment of cross-ethnic networking. These cross-ethnic networks were 
successful because most of the refugees were young, educated and came from 
multiethnic urban areas, and often they were themselves of ethnically mixed 
backgrounds. They themselves had no other experience but that of peaceful 
multiethnic coexistence and friendships before the conflict. Even those who 
themselves experienced victimisation and in some cases severe ill-treatment because 
of their ethnicity, such as those who were imprisoned in some of the concentration 
camps in Bosnia, were part of these networks. In some cases, for example, they shared 
accommodation and made close friendships with people of different ethnic 
backgrounds and from different parts of former Yugoslavia.  
 
My research indicates that a similar pattern of spontaneous and cross-ethnic 
networking emerged among refugees from former Yugoslavia who arrived in 
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Amsterdam before legal and other procedures for their protection and reception were 
set for them. A Muslim woman from Bosnia talks about her experience: 
Those who came here by early 1993 were helping each other. There was 
nothing here [no organised assistance to those feeling former Yugoslavia] so 
we were exchanging any bit of information we had, we helped each other with 
finding shelter for the newly arrived. I had a couple from Croatia, for example, 
for almost five months, although I’d never seen them before. It was a very 
tense period in terms of politics and war, and I remember arguments and 
tensions between some of the people I used to socialise with. But we were all 
in the same boat then [refugees from variety of ethnic backgrounds and from 
different parts of former Yugoslavia], and I can’t recall any serious problems 
or people who wouldn’t help each other. 
 
Although, unlike in Italy, networks of old immigrants from the region existed in the 
city, not many of those who arrived early had any closer contacts with them. They all 
felt that most of these people came to the Netherlands for different reasons and under 
different circumstances, that is, as ‘guest-workers’, rather than as people forced to 
move because of war. Additionally, most of the refugees pointed to the difference in 
educational background between those that arrived in the late 60s and themselves 
which, they felt, created problems in communication and mutual understanding.  
  
 As the war intensified and with it the number of people seeking asylum in the 
Netherlands increased, the Dutch government introduced legal and other measures to 
assist these refugees and to meet their needs. These state interventions, as my research 
reveals, have shaped inter-ethnic relations among the populations fleeing former 
Yugoslavia in many unintended ways, one being the maintenance of tension and 
furthering of social distance between different ethnic groups in exile. My research 
documents that after the initial spontaneous cross-ethnic networking experienced by 
those who arrived in Amsterdam in the early years of war, social networks among 
refugees were soon reshaped. They became primarily family and kinship based 
networks or established along ethnic lines. The family and kinship networks were due 
to their legal status, which allowed family reunification, as well as to socio-economic 
conditions in the country that were favourable to people fleeing with their families.  
 
The establishment of social contacts along ethnic lines was the result of three 
interrelated factors. First, many of the interviewed came from parts of Bosnia heavily 
affected by war and were themselves subjected to victimisation because of their ethnic 
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origin. Thus, the organisation of their experience of war and sense of difference made 
them reluctant to (re)establishing ties and relationships of trust across ethnic 
boundaries. Second, the Dutch policy system involved a well-organised system of 
provisions, leaving no need for intense networking among refugees and their search 
for alternative routs into the society. Moreover, some aspects of this policy system, 
such as prolonged periods of stay in accommodation centres for asylum seekers, as 
my research indicates, tend to intensify the importance of ethnic boundaries. A man 
from Bosnia emphasises this kind of problem: 
The situation at the centre [the accommodation centre] was difficult because we 
didn’t have any information about how long the procedure was going to last. We 
had nothing to do, we just sat there and waited, and we became paranoid about 
what we could say to people and who we could trust. There were people from all 
nationalities [of former Yugoslavia] there and tensions were inevitable because we 
just sat and talked about what had happened back home and why we had to leave. 
After a while, there was nothing left to talk about, only were left tension and 
hatred. 
 
Third, they found refuge in a country with a relatively large and well-established 
immigrant population from former Yugoslavia, which had already been bitterly 
divided along ethnic lines. The Netherlands, as some other European countries, had a 
considerable number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia who came as so-called 
‘guest workers’ in the 1960s and 1970s. Before the war broke-out in the country, the 
majority of them formed communities of compatriots linked to the then Yugoslav 
embassies and consular offices in the places of their settlement. For the most part, 
these communities perceived themselves as Yugoslavs. With the increase of the 
political tensions in former Yugoslavia, the violent conflict and the consequent 
rupture of the federal state along ethnic lines, the majority of these immigrants aligned 
themselves with the new states that emerged during the war, with their institutions and 
their politics. Consequently, in the Netherlands, as in some other European countries, 
the networks of old migrants from the former Yugoslavia were deeply involved in and 
affected by the identity politics of war. Moreover, links with immigrant/ethnic 
associations are encouraged in Dutch multi-cultural society, as is the case in many 
other European countries.  Through a variety of grants the Dutch government 
financially supports a range of programmes initiated by different groups of 
newcomers/immigrants, such as mother-tongue courses for children; cultural events 
and so forth. These circumstances have become a fruitful ground for maintaining or 
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even deepening divisions and tensions caused by the conflict. A woman of Serbian 
ethnic background from Bosnia relates her experience: 
I am very disappointed because our people [from former Yugoslavia] are more 
divided here than they are back home where they fought war. I went to all three 
associations [Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian] and I feel like a stranger there. 
These people care more about their ethnic background than anything else.  
 
As Eastmond points out (1998: 178-179), ethnic tension and divisions among 
refugees tend to intensify when policies of receiving societies “concerned with the 
consequences of people ‘uprooted’ from their native cultures are reflecting 
essentialised notions of identity and culture.” She goes on to explain that although 
immigrant/refugee community organisations usually fulfil the function of orientating 
newcomers, they also are an important link to the institutions of the home country. As 
such, Eastmond concludes (1998: 164), they “constitute the major arena for the 
articulation and affirmation of a national identity”. For populations fleeing ‘new 
wars’, however, the issues concerning national identity are centrally related to the 
identity politics of war (Korac, 1999). Consequently, those associated with 
community groups were usually divided along ethnic lines. I propose, therefore, that 
ethnic tensions tend to carry on or even intensify in specific circumstances of exile, 
especially when some policies of receiving societies are reflecting essentialised notion 
of identity.  
 
The question remains for further research in what ways and to what extent 
such policies and contexts of exile may affect the prospects for post-conflict 
reconstruction and (re)building communities and societies of ethnic tolerance in the 
places of origin. This question has both conceptual and practical importance, as most 
of the refugees from the post-Yugoslav states were granted temporary protection, 
initially at least, and have been expected to return once the armed conflict was over. 
Even in countries such as the Netherlands, where a significant number of these 
refugees have eventually been granted permanent permission to stay, the state 
authorities as well as the public hope for their return.  This is expressed in various 
state-sponsored initiatives and programmes aiming at their return as well as in 
attitudes of many Dutch people. A Bosnian man explains some of these attitudes: 
I was very upset after the Dayton Peace Agreement [in 1995], because the Dutch 
were very euphoric at the time; they expected all Bosnians to go back 
immediately. They couldn’t understand that war destroyed not only houses, but 
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also relationships and ties among people. Many Dutch, even now, ask us 
[Bosnians] when are we going to go back.  
 
 My research indicates that the absence of social contacts and ethnic ties 
across ethnic boundaries in exile reinforces the feeling of irreversibly destroyed inter-
ethnic links and coexistence in the places of origin. It also suggests that such 
experiences of living ethnicity in exile shape, to some extent, attitudes of refugees 
towards return. This attitude, as my research implies, is only partially grounded in 
their assessment of the political and economic situation in their countries of origin 
and/or their ‘integration success’ in the new society. There is indication in my 
research that the attitude towards return is linked to some extent to their experience of 
ethnic tension and division in the place of exile. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This overview of some aspects of my research intended to point to problems 
involved in addressing the consequences of mass displacement of people fleeing 
conflict constructed as ethnic strife. In the three contexts of exile, I discussed here, the 
one within the region of former Yugoslavia, and the two further away, in Europe, one 
of the central issues has been the boundary formation and the role of inter-ethnic ties. 
 
One of the important macro factors affecting the process of boundary 
formation, as I argued in this paper, relates to state policies and interventions shaping 
the legal and social situation of refugees in exile. Depending on the specific historic, 
social and political context, these interventions may aim to construct boundaries of 
difference. As shown in this paper, this was the case in Serbia. There, the state 
imposed ‘othering’ of refugee women was facilitated by divisive state interventions 
and was to some extent congruent with the organisation of their experience of ethnic 
boundaries created by war and victimisation. These experiences tended to strengthen 
the subjective sense of difference among refugee women. As a consequence, many 
attempted to resettle to a third country. Therefore, the state policies were in effect 
furthering ethnic cleansing and led to a strengthening of ethnic homogeneity in the 
newly created nation states. These processes had far-reaching consequences for 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, as the territories of former 
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Yugoslavia became even more ethnically ‘pure’ and also ‘cleansed’ from a majority 
of those of ethnically mixed backgrounds. If the latter category had been protected in 
their places of origin or indeed in the post Yugoslav states where many of them 
initially fled, they could have played a crucial role in the process of (re)building social 
ties and networks destroyed by conflict and the divisive identity politics of war. 
 
The findings of my research in Italy and the Netherlands show that refugee 
policies can have unintended consequences in the receiving societies. In the Italian 
case, where refugees were particularly disadvantaged because of the lack of social 
security systems, refugee networks served as an alternative ‘self-reception’ or self-
help system for disseminating information, resolving housing problems, and finding 
work. There were intensive contacts across ethnic boundaries that resulted from the 
specific circumstances in which the refugees lived. Contacts developed primarily 
because of the absence of an organised reception and assistance system. These 
circumstances have created a situation in which people fleeing the deeply divided and 
war-torn region had to recreate links and coexistence destroyed by war. They had to 
reach outside their ethnic groups and form cross-ethnic networks in order to confront 
the marginalization and discrimination they were experiencing in Italy. In the 
Netherlands, as the discussion in this paper indicated, the state interventions 
developed to assist refugees have contributed in a way to upholding ethnic tension 
and to furthering social distance between different ethnic groups in exile. As I 
proposed, ethnic tension among the peoples fleeing ‘new wars’ tends to continue or 
even intensify in specific circumstances of exile, especially when the policies of the 
receiving societies are reflecting essentialised notions of identity.  
 
The question to what extent the problems of living ethnicity in different 
contexts of exile may affect the prospects for post-conflict reconstruction and 
(re)building communities and societies of ethnic tolerance in the places of origin is a 
question that requires further research and policy considerations. This question is 
important, as most of the refugees from the post-Yugoslav states were granted 
temporary protection, initially at least, and have been expected to return once the 
armed conflict was over. Indeed, this is a very interesting question - would it be 
possible to elaborate a bit more on it? 
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1 This article is based on some findings of my Ph.D. thesis entitled ‘The Power of Gender in the 
Transition from State Socialism to Ethnic Nationalism, Militarisation, and War: The Case of Post-
Yugoslav States’ (York University, Canada, September 1998). It also outlines some aspects of the 
research presented in the report entitled ‘Dilemmas of Integration: Two policy contexts and refugee 
strategies for integration’, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, December 2001.  
 
2 Refugees involved in my research were Croats, Muslims and Serbs, as well as those of a variety of 
ethnically mixed backgrounds, who fled armed conflicts and tensions in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. 
The term Muslim is used here in reference to nationality of the refugees in this research, because 
constitutionally Muslims in former Yugoslavia were regarded as nationality and not as a religious 
group or affiliation.  
 
3 Duffield (1997) and Kaldor (1999), among others, discuss in detail the characteristics of ‘new wars’. 
 
4 The first two field visits were financially supported by the Gender Unit, Centre for Refugee Studies, 
York University. My visit to Serbia, FR Yugoslavia, in 1997 was financially assisted by the 
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. Without this financial support, for which I am 
most grateful, this research would not have been possible. 
 
 
5 The research in Italy and the Netherlands was funded by the Lisa Gilad Initiative, the European 
Commission through the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, as well as The British Council, 
The Heyter Travel Fund, and The Oppenheimer Fund. The Lisa Gilad Initiative is a charitable trust, set 
up in 1998, to commemorate the life and work of the late Lisa Gilad, an anthropologist and a founding 
member of Canada Immigration and Refugee Board. 
 
 
6 A town in Eastern Bosnia, formerly Foca, with a majority Bosnian Muslim population before the war. At 
the time of my research, it was a Serb held town, called Srbinje. All Bosnian Muslims in Foca were 
‘cleansed’. 
 
7 The 1981 census is the last reliable census for the whole region. The 1991 census was conducted just 
before the outbreak of war, and the data collected were never processed through the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics. Instead, each republic, after gaining sovereignty, had published partial data. 
 
8 The data refer to UNHCR report, July 1995, as well as the instances of 'ethnic cleansing' in Srebrenica 
and Zepa (Bosnia) and in the region of Krajina (Croatia). Nasa Borba (August 10, 1995:5).  
 
9 For more information on the cross-ethnic character of these networks see my article “Cross-Ethnic 
Networks, Self-Reception System, and Functional Integration of Refugees from former Yugoslavia in 
Rome”, Journal of International Migration and Integration, Winter 2001, 2(1): 1:27.  
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